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BOOK REVIEWS
THE AMERICAN LAWYER
By Albert P. Blaustein and Charles 0. Porter,
with Charles T. Duncan. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1954. Pp. xiii, 360. $5.50.
It is a refreshing thing to come across a book like that written by
Albert P. Blaustein and Charles 0. Porter, with Charles T. Duncan,
and the University of Chicago Press should be complimented for pub-
lishing so valuable a volume. It might have been a very" dull and
tedious book but it is not. Indeed, it is a singularly able performance.
In it will be found a simple, well written and scholarly account of
the legal profession. I have been delighted with its clarity, its insight
and its good style.
A survey by the authors of this book was espoused by the Carnegie
Foundation and the American Bar Association at a cost of a quarter
of a million dollars. The work that went into this survey was pro-
digious. More than three hundred research workers collaborated on the
project and their labors produced several thousand printed pages of
reports. All of this vast information has been condensed into 360 well
written and very interesting pages.
Because of its general excellence we were not surprised that the
survey on which the book is based had been begun by Chief Justice
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, whose all but miraculous erudition seemed to
have inspired not only the survey but the book resulting from it. "It
was designed," writes Reginald Heber Smith in the foreword, "to
make available to readers of public opinion -business executives,
economists, editors, journalists, labor leaders, clergymen, scholars,
social workers, sociologists, teachers, and vocational guidance coun-
selors - as well as to the members of the public generally, and to
the members of' the bar, a summary of the facts, cognate material and
recommendations assembled by the survey of the legal profession
during the last seven years." We share the belief expressed by Mr.
Smith that we "can rely on this volume as an honest summary of the
survey reports" and his faith "that this volume will be widely used."
To pick and choose from the many excelleni things set forth in
this volume would be to slight those not mentioned, yet how can we
omit the authors' quotation from de Toqueville's famous book: "The
profession of the law," this youthful Frenchman wrote, "is the only
aristocratic element which can be amalgamated without violence with
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the natural elements of democracy... I cannot believe that a republic
could subsist if the influence of lawyers in public business did not
increase in proportion to the power of the people."
Appreciating as we all do that "lawyers have never been popular
in American society," the authors, although obviously not with ap-
proval, quote Carl Sandburg's lines:
"Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does the hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away?"
If lawyers are misjudged, it is due (our authors tell us) in part at
least, to the failure of the bar to make its work plain to the public. This
book, more than any I have come upon, presents to public view the
nature of the lawyer's work.
They discuss the way in which our profession is organized into
various Bar associations and the work which these Associations do,
and gives us an interesting history of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, the New York County Lawyers' Association,
the American Bar Association, and many others. One of those reviewed
is the Chicago Bar Association, and there is nothing in the book that
recalls more nostalgically the difference between our hard-bitten times
and the Lucullan '80's. In 1881 the menu for the annual dinner of the
Chicago Bar Association was as follows:
Oysters on Half Shell Green Turtle Soup
Small Patties a la Financiere
Boiled Salmon, with small Potatoes
Filet of Beef, Larded, with Mushrooms
Asparagus Baked Mashed Potatoes
Roast Turkey Stuffed Cranberry Sauce
Green Peas Stewed Tomatoes
Cutlets of Partridge, a la Villeroy
Escalloped Oysters - Baked in Shell
Punch, a la Romaine
Saddle of Venison, Larded and Braised
Game Sauce
Roast Quail on Toast, with Jelly
Boned Turkey, with Jelly.
Chicken a la Mayonaise Lettuce Dessert
Fruit Coffee Edam Cheese Crackers Roquefort Cheese
If there were no better lawyers then than now, at least they must
have weighed more than their modern counterparts.
This book is really an informative, relevant and useful compendium
of the vast research which went into it. From it you will find out
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just how many lawyers there are in the United States, what their
average and median net income is, how much it costs to run a law
office, the lawyers' working hours, how women fare as members of
the bar, the various ways in which lawyers serve the public, legal
aid, the lawyer as a law maker, the lawyer as a fighting man, the re-
forms of judiciai administration, legal education, the case method-
its merits and defects, the model law center, the lawyers' pre-law
school education, the reading habits of lawyers, the growth of law
libraries. And there are many other topics.
But the best chapter is, I think the eighth, which deals With legal
ethics. It does so in great detail and with sober scholarship; nothing
here is urged or applauded with which lawyers of the highest character
could possibly disagree. The authors quote Wigmore: "If the law
is thus set, apart as a profession, it must have traditions and tenets of
its own, which are to be mastered and lived up to. This living spirit
of the profession, which limits it yet uplifts it as a livelihood, has
been customarily known by the vague term of 'legal ethics.' There is
much more to it than rules of ethics. There is a whole atmosphere of
life's behavior. (Italics mine). What is signified is all of the learning
about the traditions of behavior which mark off and mask the legal
profession as a guide of public officers, and the apprentice must hope
and expect to make full acquaintance with this body of traditions,
as his manual of equipment, without which he cannot do his part to
keep the law on the level of a profession."
It is- a refreshing thing to read a book so temperate, so fair, and so
just. We find here no cynical view of the legal profession, no sug-
gestion such as that contained in a book published at about the same
time by the Harvard University Press and written by Charles P.
Curtis1 where, among other things, he wrote that "The law has always
been unintelligible and I may say that perhaps it ought to be" and
that "The administration of justice is no more designed to elicit the
truth than the scientific approach is designed to extract justice from
the atom." Then Mr. Curtis wrote "There is no reason why a lawyer
should not recognize the knavery that is part of his profession. An
honest man is not responsible for the vices or stupidity of his col-
league and need not refuse to practice them."
After reading Mr. Curtis' volume, it is a refreshing thing indeed
to come upon the clear, fair and authoritative discussion of the legal
profession which Messrs. Blaustein and Porter have produced for us.
LLOYD PAUL STRYKER*
* Counselor at Law, New York, N.Y.
1. CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW (1954).
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AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860; WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO MASSACHUSETTS. By Edwin Merrick Dodd. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1954. Pp. xix, 524. $7.50
Comparatively few modern legal scholars manage to pursue their
subjects historically. To breast today's torrent is challenge enough.
Like the ordinary practitioner, distinguished teachers tend to con-
centrate on the recent and current law of their jurisdictions or
specialty-and leave history to the seminars and Ph.D's. Law schools
and the Bar thus are primarily, and increasingly, hives of analyzers;
more and more, synthesis consists in filling and refilling the current
combs. An annual survey of a subject or a jurisdiction is a respectable
undertaking in itself. Corpus Juris Secundum has for years been a
continuous corporate enterprise. Treatises tend more and more toward
the practical-threads through the labyrinthian maze-with criticism
relegated to prefaces such as those the late Robert H. Montgomery
wrote for his tax manuals 1 -incandescent bits of fury and frustration!
Quite evidently, our age is one of specializing practice and of corporate
research and authorship, with seemingly inevitable neglect of history
and broader social context. Happily, we still live on our capital. But
once the elders are gone the longitudinal view may get turned com-
pletely sideways: History then will be straight Legislative History, and
law authorship and practice more akin to industries than professions.
There is a paradox, a disturbing dilemma here. Law is an historical,
social science. It grows, amoeba-like, forever flowing and becoming in
interaction with its materials and surroundings; unplanned, undis-
ciplined, unstable-chaotic and vital as life and the American Digests
themselves. To study only the end-buds, to watch movement alone, to
tabulate or to attempt to anticipate merely the course and results of
growth, rather than to study the process as such, and attempt to mold
and direct it, ultimately will be to abandon the garden to the jungle, or
renounce social physiology and pediatrics for anatomy and prescription
writing. Forms reflect and express function; rules are rationalized
behavior, not random growths. Law divorced from history is life
severed from its roots. Context always is the key to law; yet with
both law and environment growing progressively more complex, to
study and master legal rules alone becomes first a temptation, then a
necessity. Analysis begins to outstrip criticism and resynthesis; tech-
nics become ends rather than means; a profession in danger of losing
its way at length finds itself throwing overboard instruments necessary
for its survival.
The American law of business corporations has been a dramatic
1. See MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON CORPORATIONS 1942-43 (1943), and
succeeding annual volumes; also MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES: ESTATES,
TRUSTS AND GIFTS 1948-49 (1948).
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instance of such neglect. The corporation is one of the basic inventions
of our age and increasingly is recognized as such.2 Moreover, this di-
vision of our law, as Professor Dodd points out, is largely indigenous.
(p. 195). English precedents on most points were few and counted for
little. Rarely has legal growth been more rapid or more completely
enmeshed in politics. "The history of the developing meaning of the
word 'corporation'" as Professor Schlesinger has reminded, literally
is a "history of American economic life."
'3
Ordinarily circumstances such as these would bespeak overwhelming
interest and research. Yet not here! Except for Professor Davis' gen-
eration-old study4 of the period to 1800, and the late Gerard Hender-
son's classic monograph on the constitutional position of the foreign
corporation, 5 there has been almost no attempt to view the corporation
genetically. And until recent pioneer works by the Handlins,6 Hartz,7
and Cadman8 bearing on the corporation's rise in Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, respectively, the period from 1800 on
was virtually a blank book. Our federal system-so often and under-
standably a boon to promoters, and a catalyst of corporate growth-
also has been the despair and nemesis of historians. The corporation
literally conquered and transformed our economy in the century and
a half after 1800, yet we still know very little of how it happened, or
why.
These final studies by Professor Dodd, edited and posthumously pub-
lished by his colleagues at Harvard as a memorial volume, go far
toward redressing this neglect. Professor Dodd's introduction ought to
be read by all who direct or undertake historico-legal or economic
studies in the American states. Observe, for example, the way the
author knifed thru the hoary "fifty-two jurisdiction" bogey that so
often stymies or delays attack on such problems: early American cor-
poration law was predominantly public law and state law-state law,
moreover, weighted heavily on the statutory side, yet all interacting
and interdependent. Statutes varied widely from state to state, and
needed to be studied genetically by jurisdictions. Case law, slower to
develop, was more uniform and truly national, but took complexion
from local statutes. Starting from scratch, and in one lifetime, how
disentangle and correlate these functions?
2. See e.g. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954).
3. Schlesinger, Principles of Historical Criticism in HARVARD GUIDE TO AMERI-
CAN HISTORY 24 (1954).
4. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS (1917).
5. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1918).
6. HANDLIN AND HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH, MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 (1947).
See also, Handlin and Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation,
5 J. EcoN. HIST. 1 (1945).
7. HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, 1776-1860 (1948).




Professor Dodd's solution was not the series of disconnected studies
at first planned, but rather to treat the case law nationally by topic,
and under the broad divisions, Public and Private, during two succes-
sive periods-1780-1830, and 1830-1860. His third and fourth chapters
then survey the Massachusetts statutes during these periods, tracing
legislative policy with reference to each of the main types of business
corporation. Since Massachusetts and New York were the most im-
portant states in the early history of corporations, this section affords
a yardstick by which to measure both the statute law of other juris-
dictions and the nationally-treated case law. (Professor Dodd's tragic
death, with Mrs. Dodd, in an automobile accident in 1951, prevented
completion of his projected survey of New York statutes). The final
section of the work surveys "The Evolution of Limited Liability in
American Industry," first in Massachusetts, then in other states of New
England.9
The whole book thus is a model and foundation, one that will give
immense impetus to allied studies. Historians and economists have
steered clear of this field largely because lawyers themselves neglected
it and because authoritative coverage of the law was a prerequisite.
Professor Dodd's first aim was a clear statement of "practitioner's law"
in the New England states. But no one ever was more aware that law
reflects and expresses policy, that policy in turn is formulated and
crystallizing public and political opinion. So far as socio-political and
economic studies were available, Professor Dodd made good use of
them. This book accordingly is no mere digest, but marks a tremend-
ous stride toward reconstituting, and frequently, in interpreting, 10 the
historical and legal backgrounds.
Many Americans will be astonished to learn that by 1830 they could
have found "answers in American decisions to many more questions
relating to business corporations than an English lawyer... could have
found in the English cases, and that despite the fact . . . American
case law on the subject had been practically nonexistent" 30 years
before! (pp. 120, 195). Charter phraseology too was largely indigenous.
The colonists seem to have taken few if any English models. Yet
forms soon began to standardize; legislative committees became ex-
pert draftsmen; general acts developed for the commoner types of
9. Four portions of uncompleted chapters, "The Statutory Regulation of
Turnpikes, Canals, and Railroads in States Other Than Massachusetts," appear
as Appendix A, pp. 441-51.
The book's scholarly apparatus is impeccable. In addition to an excellent in-
dex, tables of cases, statutes, books, articles and sources, and the Dodd
Bibliography cited infra note 17, there is a useful Table of New England
Corporations, organized into twelve classes-Banking, Bridges, etc. Dean
Griswold's Foreword and Professor Chafee's memoir, Edwin Merrick Dodd,
complete the distinguished volume.
10. E.g., see p. 134 for an interesting analysis of how the minority stock-
holder problem was affected by the shift from turnpikes and canals to railroads.
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incorporation; by 1830 these acts in states like Massachusetts had
"assumed a distinctly modern form"-had already "marked out the
general lines on which the statutory business corporation law of the
United States was to develop." (p. 198).
Some pioneer decisions were equally prescient, even when matura-
tion came slowly. For example, corporate personality under the due
process and "natural rights" clauses of the state constitutions began to
emerge in public corporation cases as early as 1805.11 But after receiv-
ing the blessing and support of Webster and Kent, the doctrine got
sidetracked by Marshall's shrewd preference in the Dartmouth College
Case12 for the federal Contract Clause. Not until decisions upholdi'ng
the legislatures' reserved powers to "alter" and "amend" corporate
charters had thoroughly riddled Marshall's screen and shield was in-
terest in corporate personality destined to revive.
By contrast, corporate citizenship for foreign corporations under
both the Diversity and Comity Clauses remained thorny issues
throughout the period. (pp. 34, 46, 150). Today interstate comity and
sufferance strike us as frail props for business nationalism; yet nothing
more substantial was available during and after the Bank War and in
a nation rent over slavery. The wonder, accordingly, is not that the
Taney Court's interpretation of the Diversity Clause proved so tortu-
ous and became larded with fictions,13 but that so thin a margin of
social and judicial tolerance proved almost ideally suited to secure
corporate growth-certainly far more so than the opposing and dissent-
ing views of timid conservatives like Story and Webster would have
been. (pp. 19-34, 124ff). Professor Dodd's account leaves no doubt
that Taney's Charles River Bridge14 and Bank of Augusta15 opinions
were masterpieces of intuitive statesmanship. Together with the
wavering line of Diversity Clause decisions, they enabled corporate
and interstate business to go where it was needed and tolerated, to
demonstrate its utility, safeguard its contracts (and be held to them)
without at the same time sheltering the old bridge, canal and turnpike
monopolies at the expense of new railroad interests, and without
antagonizing Jacksonian opinion, which, in theory at least, was hostile
to all corporations.'6 Here again Americans were marching forward
while facing backward, yet the outcome of itself scarcely warrants
11. Trustees of the University v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Murph.) 58 (1805), discussed
by Dodd at 19-20.
12. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U.S. 1819).
13. Cf. HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 5; McGovney, A Supreme Court
Fiction, 56 HARV. L. REv. 853, 1090, 1225 (1943).
14. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 (U.S. 1837), discussed
by DODD at 124 ff., 240.
15. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (U.S. 1839), discussed by DODD 150
if.; see also id. 46-57.
16. See SwIsHER, ROGER B. TANEY. CC. 18-19 (1935); 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME




criticism. So far as the role of the judiciary is concerned, and on the
basis of Swisher's and Schlesinger's as well as Dodd's conclusions, the
implication is that judges whose faith in new enterprise and in democ-
racy predisposes them to take some chances with those who still be-
lieve there are good chances to take are the judges whose views history
is likely to vindicate. Taney, in short, not Marshall nor Story, was the
real godfather of the American business corporation. He viewed it
moreover, with as strict and puritanical a conscience as Professor
Dodd often did himself in later years.
17
Traditionally, greatest interest has lain in these constitutional prob-
lems. For that very reason Professor Dodd's definitive summaries of
the private law are most valuable. His evidence and conclusions some-
times are startling: For example: Was limited liability indispensible to
development of the business corporation? Surveying the evidence,
Professor Dodd holds not:
"No doubt the development of American industry would eventually
have been seriously retarded if our legislatures had failed to encourage
investment by limiting the investor's risk. Nevertheless, the early
industrial history of Massachusetts and Rhode Island as well as that of
England furnishes persuasive evidence that, granted otherwise favorable
conditions, the factory system of industrial organization can live and
thrive under a legal system which denies to those who invest for profit
the right to limit their risk taking to the amount of their investment.
It is probably true that the wide distribution of corporate shares among
large numbers of small holders which has come to be a characteristic fea-
ture of most of the larger industrial enterprises of the present day could not
have come about if share-ownership still involved personal liability for
corporate debts. But, although trading in the shares of industrial cor-
porations was not unknown in quite early days, stock-market activity was
mainly concerned with railroad securities until towards the end of the
nineteenth century. Investment in industrial shares by the general public
did not take place on a large scale until the 1890's-a period when invest-
ment bankers were beginning to form industrial combinations and to sell
the securities created in the process to their customers. Fifty years after
1830-the year in which the Massachusetts legislature substituted the
limited-liability manufacturing charter for the full-liability charter-
the characteristic type of American manufacturing company was still the
corporation with a rather small number of owners. It is doubtful whether
the development of corporations of that type and the growth of American
industry through their instrumentality would have been greatly retarded
if all the states had withheld the privilege of limited liability from Ameri-
can industrial entrepreneurs for a half-century after 1830."18
17. See Appendix B, Biblography of Published Writings of Merrick Dodd,
452-458, and particularly For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HAEv. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Is Effective Enforcement of the Fudiciary Duties of
Corporate Managers Practicable? 2 U. oF CmI. L. REV. 194 (1935).
18. P. 390. See also 379-380 for Professor Dodd's skepticism of claims that




Together with other recent works by Hartz19 and Pierce,20 Professor
Dodd's elaborate summaries should dispel forever the myth that early
American law and polity were laissez faire, non-interventionist in
character. Government played a creative role in establishing and guid-
ing our economy-did so both as a promotional and regulatory force.
The notion of an enterprise system that originated and somehow per-
sisted to 1860-or even until 1932-unsullied by statutes and policed
only by village constables, certainly is not Professor Dodd's picture.
The scope and detail of early Massachusetts charters-provisions re-
quiring loans to agriculture and manufacturing, for example (p. 203)-
suggest that "creeping regimentation" has been with us from the start,
and was almost as palatable then as it is still, sugared with government
loans, subsidies, and franchises.
Overall, the impression gained is of the creative, yet at times per-
haps, adventitious, statesmanship of pre-Civil War corporation law,
both case and statutory. (viz. p. 268). Legislative strictness, mistrust
of corporations, public caution, experimentation, even partisan rivalry
and political vacillation in chartering and control21 were for the most
part fortunate, even beneficial. The United States plainly needed both
the Whig and the Jacksonian traditions. Professor Schlesinger's thesis2
that the Jacksonian reforms democratized the corporation and saved
it, finds broad suplort in these pages (Cc. IV-VI and pp. 435-36), just
as it finds parallels in our day, however unappreciated in some quar-
ters. Marshall's Contract Clause would have been insufferable without
Taney's qualifications of it. Taney's police power was the necessary
counter to doctrinaire vested rights. Federalism and separation of
powers unquestionably have given us complex government. Second
and third guessing makes for delay, and has some serious disadvan-
tages. "State laboratories" are not always "insulated"; certainly not
all "experiments" in them have been happily contrived or executed.
Yet,
"We hae meat, an' we can eat,
Sae let the Lord be thankit."
Readers generally as well as stockholders and directors, can join in
the Covenanter's Grace as they ponder the evidence and backgrounds
in this fascinating book.
Singlehandedly, Professor Dodd has covered the first half of the
corporation's story. He has laid the foundations for the remainder. By
1860, the corporation had reached maturity-stood poised for another
19. Op. cit. supra note 7.
20. PIERCE, RAILROADS OF NEW YORK: A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AID, 1826-1875
(1953) (New York state alone contributed $10.3 million; and its 300 cities and
towns $36.8 millions over a 50-year period.)
21. See DODD'S index: "Whigs," "Democrats."
22. Op. cit. supra note 16, at 384.
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phenomenal advance. Though the statutory and case groundwork had
been laid, there still was one significant gap: constitutional status re-
mained clouded, uncertain. The Contract Clause had been hedged; the
full negative possibilities of the Commerce Clause still were academic,
hypothetical.3 Counsel for interstate businesses like insurance re-
mained infatuated with a hopeless formula based on the Comity
Clause. Due process was burgeoning, but still only a potential. (p. 156).
Another generation of unfettered economic growth, of judicial hesita-
tion, of counsels' despairing trial and error were needed before the
corporation found its ultimate niche-a constitutional "person" under
the Equal Protection 24 and Due Process Clauses.25 It can hardly be
doubted'that this problem of integrating the corporation and corporate
property into the Constitution was one of the most troublesome faced
by the Court-the more so because the guises were so deceptively
simple, because the Court's maneuverability often was so limited, be-
cause the whole problem became submerged in Reconstruction and
bedevilled by the strong need and prevalent demand for legislative
regulation. Ultimately the solution came by default rather than by
positive choice-one of the instances where the Court tacitly and
passively accommodated and chose between two conflicting circuit
holdings without stating the policy considerations that dictated the
choice.26
This is an equally fascinating story. One wishes Professor Dodd had
lived to write it and to chart its branches and backgrounds: the simul-
taneous upsurge, for example, of post-Civil War legislative regulation
and of hog-wild competitive chartering; of the migratory corporation
and liberalized removal acts;27 of jammed appellate dockets and
insular-minded judges like Field, parroting old dogmas and at times
undisposed even to question shocking misstatements in a distinguished
23. Cf. the arguments and opinions in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U.S.
1869) and Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1
(1878).
24. County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 13 Fed. 722, 8 Saw.
238 (C.C. Cal. 1882); County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 18
Fed. 385, 9 Saw. 165 (C.C. Cal. 1883), 118 U.S. 394, 396. (1886). For the history
and significance of these cases, see Graham, An Innocent Abroad: The Con-
stitutidnal "Person," 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. No. 2 (Feb., 1955)'.
25. Minneapolis and St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889).
26. See Graham op. cit. supra note 24.
27. Liberalization of corporation laws during periods of ascendant anti-
corporate opinion, notably during the Jacksonian and Granger eras, is one of
the recurrent paradoxes of corporation history. See DODD at 435, and
SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 16 for rationales. One of the most striking in-
stances of such legislation is Congress' passage of the -Carpenter Act of March 3,
1875, 18 STAT. 470, at the height of the Granger agitation, "vastly extending the
domain of the federal courts" in corporation cases. Thompson's new and in many
respects admirable biography, MATTHEW H. CARPENTER, WEBSTER OF Tim WEST
(1954) fails to clarify, and indeed barely mentions, Carpenter's relation to
this crucial measure. But see FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT 65-69 (1927).
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counsel's brief.28 Truly, some rich lodes await continuers of this narra-
tive-and power shovels will be more helpful than Geiger counters in
New Jersey, Kentucky and Delaware!
Patently, our introduction overstated a case. Given proper care and
planning, History still can guide the law, even in most complex fields,
and- forty-eight jurisdictions or not. Over a period of a century and a
half we have been learning how to live with the corporation; it is time
today to begin understanding it. Professor Dodd's professional career
was dedicated to both purposes. His critical writings contributed im-
measurably to the former. The major historical studies here collected
greatly advance the latter. It is an impressive, fitting memorial. Yet
by itself it would not have satisfied Professor Dodd. He looked to com-
pletion of this story-as one basic to our national life. It now remains
for his colleagues and successors in the social sciences to follow
through.
HOWARD JAY GRAHAM*
28. See Graham, supra note 24.
* Los Angeles County Law Library; Guggenheim Fellow 1953-54.
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